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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AGAINST PHARMACEUTICAL
PRODUCT HOPPING: PROTECTING CONSUMERS OR REACHING
TOO FAR?

ABSTRACT
Pharmaceutical drugs are the backbone of modern medicine, which makes
the continued development of new drugs essential and puts many lives in the
hands of the brand-name pharmaceutical companies that develop these new
treatments. Currently, antitrust litigation is being used to strike a balance
between the innovator’s right to earn a profit and the need for generic drug
companies to make these drugs available to the masses that need them.
Antitrust law stops brand-name companies from taking over the market and
excluding generics, but it should not be used to impose harsh remedies that
restrict the thing that we all rely upon: brand-name companies’ motivations to
innovate.
The federal districts are split on this issue, and although the facts differ in
each case, the courts agree that the presence of consumer coercion is what
differentiates permissible competitive strategies by brand-name companies
from impermissible, anticompetitive product hopping. Intertwined with the
issue of product hopping is how to remedy it. While fines are an appropriate
penalty, the Second Circuit’s injunction that forced a brand-name company to
continue manufacturing a discontinued and possibly outdated drug is
unprecedented and threatens the very thing society must protect—brand-name
companies’ abilities to innovate. Product-hopping litigation shows no signs of
slowing down, and between the Second Circuit’s far-reaching injunction and
the growing possibility of a circuit split, the time is right for the United States
Supreme Court to take up product-hopping litigation and issue an affirmative
ruling that allows generics to provide people the drugs they desperately need,
while also providing brand-name pharmaceutical companies the ability and
motivation to continue innovating.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Western medicine is powered by technology, constantly improving
treatments, increasing quality measures, and perhaps most integral to this
system, ubiquitous use and reliance on pharmaceuticals. Continuous
improvement, innovation, and development of pharmaceuticals are essential to
the health care system. To ensure that these drugs become affordable to the
masses, there is legislation that provides incentives to stimulate innovation
while also encouraging generic drug manufacturers to enter the market and
provide drugs at a more affordable price. However, brand-name
pharmaceutical companies are averse to parting with profits easily, which has
spawned the trend of product hopping.
In recent years, several brand-name pharmaceutical companies have
attempted, with mixed results, to engage in product hopping to preclude
generics from entering the market. Although the intersection of intellectual
property law, antitrust law, and millions of dollars in profit draw significant
attention to product hopping, the balance between quality, continued
innovation, and access by consumers remains at the center of the issue.
Following a split among federal district courts in deciding these cases, the
Second Circuit’s decision in New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC
and the court’s bright-line rule certainly provides guidance to the
pharmaceutical industry going forward on this issue. 1 While the decision is a
victory for consumers and antitrust advocates alike, the Second Circuit broke
new ground by reaching into a previously untouched area. This decision has
potential to harm brand-name pharmaceutical companies if this remedy is
abused. The remedy requiring a pharmaceutical company to continue
manufacturing a discontinued drug reaches too far and sets a dangerous
precedent.
Section II of this comment provides the necessary history and background
for understanding product hopping. It also presents the issues involved with
product hopping, and examines arguments from both sides as to why or why
not this action should be regulated by antitrust law. Section III analyzes the
holdings and implications of the federal district court cases involving product
hopping, as well as the recent Second Circuit decision on this issue. This
comment concludes with Section IV, which discusses the fallout from the
string of product-hopping cases, as well as the potential for intervention from
the Supreme Court to make an ultimate ruling on this issue.
II. BACKGROUND
Although this comment will generally examine pharmaceutical product
hopping through the lens of antitrust law, it is important to note that this issue

1. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 2015).
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implicates other legal areas. For instance, often times patent and intellectual
property law act as a catalyst for product-hopping cases. Moreover, other laws
regulating the pharmaceutical market also play a substantial role. This section
begins with an explanation of product hopping and then introduces some of the
laws and regulations that come into play. These laws and regulations facilitate
a better understanding as to why pharmaceutical companies employ the tactic
of product hopping.
A.

Product Hopping Explained

Simply put, product hopping occurs when a brand-name pharmaceutical
company takes an existing drug, modifies the formula of that drug, and then
attempts to shift consumers from the old version of the drug to the new
version. 2 In an era of constant software version 2.0 updates, this may seem like
pharmaceutical companies are simply putting out a 2.0 version of their product.
However, in an Amicus Brief, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) explains
the anticompetitive motives of many product hoppers, asserting that product
hopping can interfere with the regulations that govern the sale of brand-name
and generic drugs and can also inhibit price competition in the pharmaceutical
market. 3 The FTC further explains, “A brand company can interfere with the
mechanism by which generic drugs compete by making modest nontherapeutic changes to its product, and effectively prevent generic
competition.” 4 An examination of policy considerations, the interaction
between generic drugs and antitrust law, and the unique pharmaceutical market
illuminates the motives behind product hopping.
While product hopping certainly carries large ramifications for
pharmaceutical profits, it also implicates several policy concerns for the
pharmaceutical industry. Turning first to brand-name pharmaceutical
companies, the central argument is that antitrust scrutiny of product hopping
prevents brand pharmaceutical companies from innovating. 5 In its Amicus
Brief supporting Actavis in the recent Second Circuit case, the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) asserts, “The preliminary
injunction [against Actavis] dampens the very competition and innovation the

2. Jessie Cheng, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical Industry,
108 COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1472 (2008).
3. Federal Trade Commission’s Brief as Amicus Curiae at 1, Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner
Chilcott Public Ltd. Co., Civ. No. 12-3824 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2012).
4. Id.
5. Brief of the American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at 25,
New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638 (2nd Cir. 2015) (No. 15-2236)
[hereinafter American Antitrust Institute Brief].
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antitrust laws are intended to foster.” 6 In the same case, Brattle Economists
echoed the concerns of PhRMA explaining, “[T]he [i]njunction [against
Actavis] is unwarranted, unnecessary, and harms both competition and
innovation.” 7 With doctors and patients relying more and more on
pharmaceuticals for treatment, 8 the concern that government regulation could
impede innovation in the pharmaceutical industry cannot be taken lightly. As
such, this general argument is ubiquitous throughout product-hopping litigation
cases. 9
Conversely, generics and antitrust enforcers rely on different policy
concerns with product-hopping cases. The first involves the unique nature of
the pharmaceutical market. In a typical market, consumers select products and
pay for them, which enables them to weigh the options and determine if the
higher cost of a product is worth the benefit. 10 However, unlike other
consumer markets, with prescription pharmaceuticals, consumers do not have
the option to strike a balance between quality and price because of the nature
of the market. 11 First, Pharmaceutical Benefit Managers (PBMs) are
responsible for administering prescriptions for a health plan. 12 PBMs negotiate
drug prices with pharmacies and develop a formulary, or “medication tiers.” 13
These “medication tiers” list the prescriptions that are covered under a
particular plan. 14 The tier that the drug is listed under determines the co-pays
for the covered drugs. 15 As a result, PBMs ultimately dictate what drugs are
covered under a plan and the co-pay that consumers will pay for them.
Adding to the complexity of the pharmaceutical market is the fact that
doctors choose the drugs that patients have to purchase, creating a “price
disconnect.” 16 The “price disconnect” refers to the situation where a physician
chooses the drugs that the consumer needs, but the consumer or the consumer’s

6. Brief for the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Appellants at 12, New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638 (2d
Cir. 2015) (No. 14-4624) [hereinafter PhRMA Brief].
7. Brief of Antitrust Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellants at 3,
New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-4624)
[hereinafter Antitrust Economists Brief].
8. Elizabeth D. Kantor et al., Trends in Prescription Drug Use Among Adults in the United
States from 1999-2012, 313 JAMA 1818, 1829 (2015).
9. See generally Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 16, 2015); New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015).
10. American Antitrust Institute, supra note 5, at 6.
11. Id. at 6–7.
12. Understanding What is a PBM, PRXN (Oct. 2009), https://www.prxn.com/docs/PRxN%
20Understanding%20PBMs.pdf.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. American Antitrust Institute, supra note 5, at 6.
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insurance company pays for the drugs. 17 Thus, a problem is created because
doctors prescribing drugs are not as likely to take price into account since they
are not paying for it. 18 Moreover, because of the “price disconnect,” physicians
have less incentive to switch patients over to generic drugs after the market
exclusivity period for a brand-name manufacturer ends. 19 Therefore, advocates
of antitrust scrutiny contend that antitrust laws are necessary to switch power
from physicians to consumers and remedy this “price disconnect” created by
the pharmaceutical market. 20
In addition to concerns with the inability of the pharmaceutical market to
regulate itself, proponents of antitrust scrutiny also focus on the consumer
access and quality arguments. In its brief supporting the patent challenger, the
American Antitrust Institute (AAI) contends, “A product reformulation
prevents the generic product from being substitutable at the pharmacy counter
for the redesigned brand product, and thus impairs the generic’s most costefficient (and only commercially feasible) means of competing.” 21 The AAI
further asserts that by maintaining monopolies, brand manufacturers reduce
consumers’ access to more affordable generics. 22 Essentially, the brand-name
pharmaceutical developers attempt to keep the generics off the market, which
forces consumers to pay the brand drug’s price, thereby reducing access. In
order to fully understand how product hopping works, some background
knowledge of the drug development process is necessary. This is because the
proprietary drug development system, which is designed to protect and nurture
innovation, is the very system that makes product hopping possible.
B.

Proprietary Drug Development and the “Patent Cliff”

Brand-name pharmaceutical companies invest huge sums of time and
money in developing new prescription drugs. 23 In fact, PhRMA reports that it
takes a minimum of ten years for a new drug to go from initial discovery to the
marketplace. 24 Moreover, a November 2014 cost study conducted by Tufts
Center for the Study of Drug Development (CSDD), which surveyed all
investigational compounds from the top fifty pharmaceutical companies in a
twelve-year window, estimated that it costs approximately $2.6 billion for a

17. Id.
18. Id. at 7.
19. Cheng, supra note 2, at 1509.
20. Antitrust Economists Brief, supra note 7.
21. Id. at 4.
22. Id.
23. TUFTS CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEV., COST OF DEVELOPING A NEW DRUG
(2014), http://csdd.tufts.edu/files/uploads/Tufts_CSDD_briefing_on_RD_cost_study_-_Nov_18,
_2014.pdf [hereinafter TUFTS].
24. PhRMA, BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, THE PROCESS BEHIND
NEW MEDICINES 1 (2015) [hereinafter PhRMA].
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brand-name pharmaceutical company to develop a new drug and win
approval. 25 Also noteworthy, out of the 1,442 compounds that the CSDD
studied, only 7.1% of the drugs were approved, with 80.3% being discontinued
at some point during the development process, and 12.6% still active in some
phase of the development process. 26 PhRMA corroborates this low approval
rate by explaining that out of all of the drugs that make it to clinical testing,
less than 12% will ever be approved. 27 Once a pharmaceutical drug makes it
through drug discovery, preclinical lab testing, and three phases of clinical
trials, 28 the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act requires that a manufacturer
must submit a New Drug Application (NDA) to the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). 29
In order to ensure that brand-name pharmaceutical companies continue to
innovate and create new drugs, the FDA offers an incentivizing carrot at the
end of this ten year, $2.6 billion stick: exclusive rights to market and sell the
newly developed drug. 30 Once the NDA is approved, pharmaceutical
companies enjoy a market exclusivity period, giving them a statutory right to
market and sell the drug to the exclusion of all competitors. 31 FDA market
exclusivity is granted when the FDA approves a new drug, and it precludes
approval of generic drugs for five to seven years. 32 On the other hand, patents
expire twenty years from the date of filing. 33 Therefore, if the brand-name
manufacturer applies for a patent at the beginning of the ten-year development
period, it holds the patent rights for the first ten years the drug is on the market
and has FDA market exclusivity for five to seven of those years. This grants
pharmaceutical companies some discretion to set prices, the idea being that the
exclusivity period enables the companies to recoup losses and generate profits
to reinvest into future research and development. 34 The exclusivity period
grants brand-name pharmaceutical companies some leeway to set prices, but
the caveat is that brand-name companies are on borrowed time until they face
the inevitable end of this freedom: the “patent cliff.” 35
25. TUFTS, supra note 23, at 5.
26. Id. at 16.
27. PhRMA Brief, supra note 6, at 6.
28. PHRMA, supra note 24, at 2, 8, 10.
29. Cheng, supra note 2, at 1475.
30. Id. at 1474.
31. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and Exclusivity,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079031.htm (last updated July 18,
2014); Cheng, supra note 2, at 1475–76.
32. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 31.
33. Id.
34. Antitrust Economists Brief, supra note 7, at 23.
35. See generally VanEck, Why the Patent Cliff is a Key Driver of Generic Drug Growth,
MKT. REALIST (Mar. 3, 2016, 1:58 PM), http://marketrealist.com/2016/03/patent-cliff-driver-ge
neric-drugs-growth/.
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After the exclusivity period expires, the brand-name manufacturer runs
into the “patent cliff,” which is the term used to describe the extreme downturn
in product sales that a pharmaceutical company experiences when its market
exclusivity period expires and competitors can enter the market. 36 Although
brand-name manufacturers may face competition from anyone, “[t]he most
potent threat to profits comes from generic manufacturers, who can produce
equivalents of off-patent brand-name drugs without incurring the high research
and development costs of drug discovery.” 37
Unsurprisingly, the entry of generics into the market has a substantial
effect on a drug’s price. Typically, the two most substantial price reductions
occur after the second entry of a generic, and then again after entry of a third
generic. 38 In fact, the FTC finds that prices drop between 13.7% and 22.6%
after entry of the second generic. 39 After entry of a third generic, the price
drops between 31.5% and 54.3%. 40 To illustrate what these percentages mean
in terms of money, take Pfizer’s Protonix, used to treat gastroesophageal reflux
disease and other acid hypersecretory diseases. 41 In 2007, Protonix made over
$1.9 billion. 42 However, in 2010, when Pfizer’s market exclusivity period
expired and generics entered the market, Protonix fell to $480 million. 43
Undoubtedly, the effects the “patent cliff” has on the revenues of brand-name
pharmaceutical companies brings to light the incentive for brand-name
manufactures to hold onto the exclusivity period for as long as possible.
C. Vehicles for Encouraging Competition: The Hatch-Waxman Act and The
Sherman Act
While the loss of revenue after generic entry is concerning for brand-name
manufacturers, the fact of the matter is that consumers rely on generic
competition to make the drugs they need to survive more affordable. 44
Recognizing the need for generics to lower prices and improve access for
36. Nathan Jessop, Responding to the Patent Cliff, PHARMTECH.COM (July 1, 2013),
http://www.pharmtech.com/responding-patent-cliff.
37. Cheng, supra note 2, at 1476.
38. See Luke M. Olson & Brett W. Wendling, The Effect of Generic Drug Competition on
Generic Drug Prices During the Hatch-Waxman 180-Day Exclusivity Period 20 (Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Working Paper No. 317, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/re
ports/estimating-effect-entry-generic-drug-prices-using-hatch-waxman-exclusivity/wp317.pdf.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Jack DeRuiter & Pamela L. Holston, Drug Patent Expirations and the “Patent Cliff,”
U.S. PHARM., June 2012, at 16.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See What are Generic Drugs?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/UnderstandingGenericDrugs/ucm14
4456.htm (last updated June 19, 2015).
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consumers, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, now known as the Hatch-Waxman Act. 45 The HatchWaxman Act has two main goals:
First . . . to ensure that brand-name . . . drug manufacturers would have
meaningful patent protection and a period of marketing exclusivity to enable
them to recoup their investments in the development of valuable new drugs.
Second . . . to ensure that, once the statutory patent protection and marketing
exclusivity for these new drugs has expired, consumers would benefit from the
46
rapid availability of lower priced generic versions.

As discussed previously, brand-name manufacturers are required to file an
NDA, and if approved, they receive the exclusivity period under the HatchWaxman Act. However, the Act allows generic drug companies to seek
expedited approvals to manufacture the brand-name drugs that passed the
expiration point of the exclusivity period. 47 When a generic drug manufacturer
wants to enter the market, they must file an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) with the FDA. 48 In addition to the expedited approval
process, the Hatch-Waxman Act grants 180-day exclusivity rights to the first
generic manufacturer to file an ANDA, allowing them to market the generic to
the exclusion of other generics during this time period. 49 Finally, the HatchWaxman Act provides avenues for generic drug manufacturers to challenge a
brand-name manufacturer’s patent exclusivity on a drug. 50
The Hatch-Waxman Act has been an effective means for bringing generics
into the market and improving access to drugs for consumers. In fact, “[s]ince
1984, over 10,000 generic drugs have entered the market, and generics now
account for close to [fifty] percent of prescriptions filled.” 51 The HatchWaxman Act and the ANDA are the competition that brand-name
manufacturers are trying to avoid with product hopping. While the HatchWaxman Act controls the small piece of the puzzle that is generic entry,
product hopping also implicates the broader authority of the Sherman Act.
In fact, no examination of product hopping would be complete without a
brief overview of the Sherman Act. In the context of product hopping, “[t]he

45. Lisa Barons Pensabene & Dennis Gregory, Hatch-Waxman Act: Overview, PRAC. L.
COMPANY 1, http://www.fitzpatrickcella.com/DB6EDC/assets/files/News/Hatch-Waxman%20
Act%20Overview%20lpensabene_dgregory.pdf (last visited July 24, 2016).
46. Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Statement before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary: Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
(Hatch-Waxman Amendments) (Aug. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Troy Statement].
47. M. Sean Royall et al., Antitrust Scrutiny of Pharmaceutical “Product Hopping,” 28
ANTITRUST 71, 71 (2013).
48. Cheng, supra note 2, at 1477.
49. Id. at 1479.
50. Pensabene & Gregory, supra note 45, at 3.
51. Troy Statement, supra note 46.
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Sherman Act[] prevent[s] patent holding manufacturers from exploiting their
patent-conferred monopoly to improperly harm competitors and threaten
consumer welfare.” 52 Generally speaking, the Sherman Act has two major
components. Section 1 reads: “Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to
be illegal.” 53 Section 2, which aims to prevent monopolies, reads in pertinent
part: “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony.” 54 As the
examination of product-hopping litigation reveals, the cases primarily involve
Section 2 challenges.
Although the Sherman Act has a broad scope, in the context of product
hopping, it is critical to note that its central focus is to promote vigorous
market competition. 55 There are many issues at play in product-hopping
litigation, but the Sherman Act forms the backdrop for much of the analysis.
Since the focus of the Sherman Act is to eliminate monopolies while fostering
vigorous competition, litigants in product-hopping cases are grappling to draw
the line between aggressive marketing and monopolization.
D. Soft Switch Versus Hard Switch
As is evident, a delicate balance exists between allowing generic entry into
the pharmaceutical market while encouraging brand-name manufacturers to
innovate. Ensuring that consumers can get prescriptions at an affordable cost is
paramount. However, consumers also need brand-name pharmaceutical
companies to continue developing new treatments for previously untreatable
ailments, and to keep improving current formulas to make them safer and more
effective. An examination of the concepts of soft switching and hard switching
is necessary to understand the balancing act courts wrestle with in producthopping cases.
A soft switch occurs when a brand-name pharmaceutical company
attempting to product hop keeps the original drug on the market and then tries
to persuade doctors and patients to switch over to its new version of the drug. 56
Alternatively, a hard switch, also known as a “forced switch,” occurs when a
pharmaceutical company discontinues the original drug with the expiring
exclusivity period and only markets the newly formulated drug. 57 As the

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Cheng, supra note 2, at 1475.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
Id. § 2.
Cheng, supra note 2, at 1500.
DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, SECOND CIRCUIT FINDS “PRODUCT HOPPING” BY A
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY TO VIOLATE ANTITRUST LAWS 3 (May 29, 2015).
57. Id. at 2.
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federal district and circuit cases illustrate, the concept of soft switching versus
hard switching is central to product-hopping litigation and appears to have
serious implications for brand-name manufacturers going forward.
Additionally, the recent Actavis case implies that the existence of hard
switching is now a dispositive factor in the analysis. 58
III. LITIGATION AND THE FEDERAL DISTRICT SPLIT
As evidenced by the previous section, the recently developed strategy of
product hopping entails a host of issues, arguments, and serious policy
implications. Not surprisingly, courts facing the issue have come down
differently on these cases depending on the facts and circumstances
surrounding each case. This section examines each of the major federal district
court product-hopping decisions and analyzes the court’s reasoning and
varying facts of each case that has led to the federal district split. This split has
caused one case to rise to the circuit level with a second pending—the outcome
of which could result in a grant of certiorari from the United States (U.S.)
Supreme Court.
A.

Abbott Laboratories v. Teva Pharmaceuticals (2006)

In May of 2006, the Federal District Court of Delaware decided what
appeared to be the first case of an antitrust claim brought against a brand-name
pharmaceutical company for product hopping. 59 In this case, the drug at issue
was TriCor, which treated high triglycerides and had indications of treating
high cholesterol. 60 Plaintiff (Teva) generic manufacturers brought an action
alleging that the brand-name manufacturer, defendant (Abbott), averted
generic entry by changing the formulation of TriCor. 61 Here, Abbott changed
the formulation of TriCor twice. 62 The first time, Abbott changed TriCor from
its original capsule to 54 milligram (mg) and 160 mg tablets. 63 Then, Abbott
changed TriCor to a new form of the tablet that came in doses of 48 mg and
145 mg. 64 During the second switch, Abbott changed the label of the drug to
reflect that the new tablet no longer needed to be taken with food. 65

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 654 (2d Cir. 2015).
Royall et al., supra note 47, at 73.
Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 415 (D. Del. 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 416. A tablet is a small mass of medicated material. Tablet, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2015). Conversely, a capsule is a small container that is
filled with medicine. Capsule, MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2015).
64. Abbott, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 418.
65. Id.
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Notably, after the first switch, Abbott stopped selling the capsules, bought
back existing supplies from pharmacies, and changed the code in the National
Drug Data File (NDDF) to “obsolete,” 66 which prevented pharmacies from
filling prescriptions for TriCor with the generic capsule. 67 Moreover, when
Abbott changed to the newer form of the tablets during the second switch,
Abbott stopped selling the old version of the tablets and changed the NDDF
code to “obsolete” again. 68 In response to this suit, Abbott filed a motion to
dismiss and argued that the new formulations were improvements on the drug,
which made the change lawful under antitrust law. 69 Additionally, Abbott
contended that even though the changed forms were disruptive to the generics,
they were under no duty to aid competitors. 70
The court rejected Abbott’s arguments and denied its motion to dismiss. 71
In its decision, the court distinguished this case from the Second Circuit
antitrust case of Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 72 In Kodak, the
plaintiff alleged that Kodak had monopoly power, and its introduction of a new
film further limited consumer choice. 73 Finding that Kodak did not violate
antitrust law by introducing a new type of film, the Second Circuit relied upon
the fact that Kodak did not quit producing its old version of the film, which
gave consumers the free choice to switch without coercing them. 74 Notably,
the Second Circuit in the Kodak decision suggested that it might have decided
differently if Kodak had removed the old film. 75 By contrast, the district court
in Teva found that when Abbott quit selling the old versions and changed the
NDDF code, it resulted in “consumer coercion” and was thereby “potentially
anticompetitive.” 76 Interestingly, although the term was not yet in use at the
time of this case, the court essentially found that by removing the previous
versions of the drug, Abbott engaged in a hard switch. Teva set up the basis for
antitrust cases filed against product-hopping brand-name companies, and as
later cases illustrate, the coercion present in this case became a key factor for

66. Id. at 416.
67. “The NDDF is a private database that provides information about FDA-approved drugs.
Changing the code to ‘obsolete’ removed the TriCor capsule drug formulation from the NDDF,
which prevented pharmacies from filling TriCor prescriptions with a generic capsule
formulation.” Id.
68. Id. at 418.
69. Royall et al., supra note 47, at 73.
70. Id.
71. Abbott, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 434.
72. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2nd Cir. 1979).
73. Abbott, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 421 (citing Berkey, 603 F.2d at 287).
74. Id.
75. Royall et al., supra note 47, at 73.
76. Id.
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determining whether or not the brand-name company’s action constituted a
hard switch.
B.

Walgreen v. AstraZeneca (2008)

Two years after the Teva decision, the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia was confronted with another pharmaceutical product-hopping
case. However, in this case, the court reached the opposite decision of that in
Teva.
This case centered on the heartburn drug Prilosec. 77 Here, plaintiff
Walgreen filed suit alleging that defendant, AstraZeneca, switched consumers
from Prilosec over to its newly FDA-approved equivalent drug Nexium, just as
the patent exclusivity period was about to expire on Prilosec. 78 The plaintiff
contended that Prilosec and Nexium were virtually identical drugs and that a
dose of Nexium would have the same effect as a dose of Prilosec. 79
AstraZeneca received FDA approval to begin making Nexium eight months
before Prilosec’s patent expired and began facing generic competition. 80 As
soon as Nexium entered the market, AstraZeneca “very aggressively
promoted” and “detailed” 81 Nexium to doctors, while it simultaneously
stopped promoting and detailing Prilosec to doctors. 82
In this case, the court granted defendant AstraZeneca’s motion to
dismiss. 83 The District Court for the District of Columbia distinguished the
Teva decision, finding that the “critical factor” was the presence of consumer
choice that was lacking in Teva. 84 The court explained that in Teva, the
defendant eliminated choice for consumers by removing the old version of its
product and changing the NDDF code. 85 AstraZeneca did not eliminate a
choice, but rather added a new choice for consumers by introducing a new
drug to compete with its already established drug, Prilosec. 86 In response to
plaintiff’s allegations that Nexium was no different than Prilosec, the court
explained that antitrust law does not require a new product to be superior
because the marketplace allows consumers to make that determination. 87

77. Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 148 (D.D.C. 2008).
78. Id. at 149.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 148.
81. Id. at 149. “‘Detailing’ in the retail pharmaceutical business refers to the practice of
sending company representatives to doctors’ offices to distribute samples and promotional
materials and information.” Walgreen, 534 F. Supp. 2d at n. 4.
82. Id. at 149.
83. Id. at 153.
84. Royall et al., supra note 47, at 74.
85. Walgreen, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 151.
86. Id.
87. Royall et al., supra note 47, at 74.
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Although the cases of Teva and Walgreen reached opposite conclusions,
they can be reconciled with little difficulty, as they illustrate the opposite ends
of the spectrum. Just as Teva gave the first example of an illegal hard switch,
Walgreen provides an example of a legal soft switch. On one end, Abbott
eliminated choice by removing the old version of TriCor from the market, and
thereby coerced consumers. 88 Conversely, Walgreen constituted a legal soft
switch because AstraZeneca did not remove its old drug Prilosec or eliminate
consumer choice, but rather added a new choice and thereby did not coerce
consumers. 89 Understanding this spectrum created by case law is critical as it
provides a guide of what is permissible and what is not for pharmaceutical
companies looking to avoid product-hopping liability. While these cases
demonstrate both ends of the spectrum, the subsequent cases are less cut and
dry.
C. Mylan Pharmaceuticals v. Warner Chilcott (2015)
More recently, a third case has come down that falls somewhere in
between the Teva and Walgreen cases. In 2015, Mylan v. Warner Chilcott 90
added an interesting wrinkle to the growing body of case law on
pharmaceutical product hopping. In that case, the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania faced a claim involving Warner Chilcott’s acne drug
Doryx, and granted summary judgment for the defendants, who included
brand-name pharmaceutical company Warner Chilcott. 91
First, the development and subsequent marketing of Doryx form an
interesting backdrop to the case. The drug Doryx has been around since 1985
and was originally developed by Mayne Pharmaceuticals (Mayne). 92 However,
sales were slow, so in 1994, Mayne entered into an agreement with Warner
Chilcott to increase sales of the drug. 93 The agreement stated that Mayne
would be the sole manufacturer and supplier of Doryx to Warner Chilcott and
that Warner Chilcott would market and distribute the drug in the United States
in return for the income from domestic sales of the drug. 94 The agreement is
still in place today and has been renewed several times, as this agreement has
increased sales of Doryx over twenty-fold since its inception. 95 Finally, it is
noteworthy that plaintiff “Mylan Pharmaceuticals is the third-largest generic
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16,
2015).
91. Memorandum at *1, Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Mylan Memorandum].
92. Id. at *2.
93. Id. at *4.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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pharmaceutical company in the world” with annual revenue of $6.13 billion,
while Mayne had a 2011 revenue of $50.1 million, and Warner Chilcott
reported a revenue of $2.7 billion that same year. 96
Turning to the claims, plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendants made
several, non-beneficial changes to Doryx over a six-year period, all of which
constituted anticompetitive product hopping. 97 The product switches at issue
were: (1) Doryx was changed from 75 mg and 100 mg capsules to 75 mg and
100 mg tablets, (2) defendant introduced a single-scored 98 150 mg tablet, (3)
defendant added a single score to the 75 mg and 100 mg tablets, and (4)
defendant added a dual score to the 150 mg tablets. 99 Additionally, Mylan
asserted that Warner Chilcott stopped selling and promoting prior versions of
Doryx, and eventually it completely removed them from the pharmaceuticals
market. 100 Notably, Mylan’s suit did not allege that defendants ever changed
the NDDF codes to preclude generic substitution, as happened in Teva. 101
In granting Warner Chilcott’s motion for summary judgment, the court
found that it did not have monopoly power and that its conduct was not
anticompetitive. 102 Turning first to the Sherman Act Section 2 claim, the court
found that defendants only had control over eighteen percent of the acne
medication market, which was not a predominant share. 103 Additionally, the
court took into account that Mylan and Warner Chilcott were competing in the
acne oral drug market, and that Mylan was “more than twice the size of
Warner Chilcott, and 100 times the size of Mayne.” 104 Turning to the
anticompetitive claim against defendants, the court found that Mylan was able
to compete with Warner Chilcott and that the changes to Doryx made by
Warner Chilcott did not exclude Mylan from competing. 105 Additionally, the
court took into account the fact that Mylan had spent no money to promote or
market its generics. 106 The court acknowledged that as a result of the changes
to Doryx, Mylan’s generics would not be automatically substituted unless
Mylan redesigned its generics to match the current version of Doryx. 107
However, the court agreed with defendant’s contention that this was a problem

96. Mylan Memorandum, supra note 91.
97. Id. at *4.
98. “A score is a groove running across the table’s surface.” Id. at *5. “A score helps a
consumer split a tablet into multiple doses.” Id.
99. Id.
100. Royall et al., supra note 47, at 75.
101. Id.
102. Mylan Memorandum, supra note 91, at *11, *16.
103. Id. at *19.
104. Id.
105. Id. at *21.
106. Id. at *23.
107. Mylan Memorandum, supra note 91, at *13.
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with Mylan’s business model but did not rise to the level of an antitrust
injury. 108
As stated above, although Teva and Walgreen were easily reconciled as
defining the outer edges of the spectrum of hard versus soft switching, the
court’s reasoning in Mylan makes it difficult to place on the spectrum. Mylan
did not rely on Teva or Walgreen, but it seems that Mylan lies somewhere in
the middle. The facts lack the essential element of coercion present in Teva.
However, elements of hard switching are present, as Warner Chilcott
eventually removed old forms of the drug, as did the defendant in Teva.
However, the fact that Warner Chilcott never changed the NDDF codes is at
least part of the reason why it did not rise to the level of coercion present in
Teva. 109
Mylan presents another example of aggressive marketing, but just as in
Walgreen, courts do not appear to view that alone as rising to the level of
coercion. Mylan’s place in the small, but growing case law on this subject is
made more complex since Mylan is appealing the district court’s rejection of
its product-hopping claim to the Third Circuit. 110 Time will tell whether the
Third Circuit will affirm the decision, which would create a split between the
Second and Third Circuit, or follow the Second Circuit’s decision in Actavis
and reverse the district court.
D. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis (2015)
The final pharmaceutical product-hopping case to examine is the most
recent case in this line of litigation and also currently the only circuit level
decision on this issue. In this case, the Second Circuit upheld a preliminary
injunction against the defendant: brand-name pharmaceutical company
Actavis. 111
Unlike the previous cases on this issue where the generic drug company
brought suit, here, New York’s Attorney General brought the claim against the
brand-name pharmaceutical company Actavis and its subsidiary Forest
Laboratories. 112 This case is centered on Actavis’s drug Namenda IR (IR),
which treats moderate to severe Alzheimer’s disease. 113 The New York
Attorney General brought an antitrust suit alleging that as the patent protection
108. Royall et al., supra note 47, at 75.
109. Id.
110. Alex Wolf, Mylan Pushes 3rd Circ. to Revive Doryx Product-Hopping Suit, LAW 360
(February 10, 2016, 4:52 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/757577/mylan-pushes-3rd-circ-to
-revive-doryx-product-hopping-suit.
111. Memorandum from Heather Lamberg Kafele and Keith Palfin of Shearman & Sterling
LLP to clients 3 (June 3, 2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter Shearman & Sterling
Memorandum].
112. Id.
113. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 2015).
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period on twice-daily IR was ending, Actavis introduced a new once-daily
version of the drug, known as Namenda XR (XR). 114 The Attorney General
claimed that by doing this, Actavis precluded generic competition for the drug
IR, and it prohibited generics for XR from entering the market until 2029
because the switch to XR would ensure patent exclusivity until that time. 115
In upholding the district court’s decision to grant an injunction barring
defendants from removing IR from the market, the court scrutinized the facts
surrounding these drugs and the defendant’s actions. 116 First, the Second
Circuit made note of the fact that IR and XR are currently the only memantine
therapy drugs on the market for individuals suffering from moderate to severe
Alzheimer’s disease. 117 IR generated over $1.5 billion in annual sales in 2012
and 2013. 118 The court also noted that the only medical difference between IR
and XR is that IR is taken twice a day and released immediately, while XR
releases gradually and is only taken once a day. 119 Other than that, the drugs
have the same active ingredients and effects, although the court acknowledged
that all other Alzheimer’s drugs were taken only once a day, like XR. 120
Although IR and XR are currently the only two drugs in this particular
market, five generics had FDA approval to enter as soon as the IR patent
expired. 121 However, the generics were planning to compete with IR, not
XR. 122 Since XR has a different dosage structure, the generics are not
equivalent to the new version of XR, and as a result, pharmacists cannot
substitute a generic IR for XR under state substitution laws. 123 State
substitution laws “permit or require pharmacists to dispense a therapeutically
equivalent, lower-cost generic drug in place of a brand drug.” 124
Turning to the alleged product hop, the facts indicate that initially, Actavis
attempted to convert patients from IR over to the new XR version. 125 At the
beginning, Actavis sold both versions, but merely stopped marketing IR and
instead spent money to promote XR. 126 However, Actavis determined that only
thirty percent of IR patients would voluntarily switch to XR before the
generics entered, so it requested that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Actavis, 787 F.3d at 647.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Actavis, 787 F.3d at 647.
Id. at 645.
See id. at 648.
Id.
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Services remove IR from its list, and it subsequently announced that IR would
be discontinued. 127
In choosing to uphold the injunction against Actavis, the Second Circuit
ruled on several of the issues that have presented themselves in the district
court cases addressing product hopping. An examination of this ruling can
provide potential guidance for brand-name pharmaceutical companies looking
to avoid these types of suits. 128 First, and perhaps most notably, the Second
Circuit drew a bright-line distinction between soft switching and hard
switching. 129 The Second Circuit affirmed the lines drawn in Teva and
Walgreen by stating that had Actavis left IR on the market and persuasively
marketed XR, which amounts to a soft switch, there would not have been
antitrust liability. 130 However, because Actavis made a hard switch by
introducing XR and effectively withdrawing IR, the court found that
“[d]efendants’ hard switch crosses the line from persuasion to coercion and is
anticompetitive.” 131
Actavis asserted that it did leave IR on the market by entering into an
agreement with a mail-order pharmacy that allowed patients to get IR if it was
“medically necessary,” but the court determined less than three percent of IR
users would be able to access it, and this was not sufficient to avoid antitrust
liability. 132 Second, the decision indicates that timing of withdrawal can be
critical. 133 The court found a violation of antitrust law in part because Actavis
removed IR before generic entry, and it explained that had Actavis waited until
after the generics were established on the market, there would not have been an
antitrust violation. 134 Finally, the Second Circuit relied heavily on the intent of
Actavis in its decision. 135 The court relied on numerous Actavis documents
that stated the intent of Actavis was to move patients from IR to XR as fast as
possible to avoid generic competition. 136 Therefore, the Second Circuit found
that Actavis’s conduct reached the level of coercion and took the opportunity
to lay down a bright-line rule for product hoppers going forward. 137
127. Id.
128. Shearman & Sterling Memorandum, supra note 111, at 5.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 5–6.
131. Actavis, 787 F.3d at 654.
132. Shearman & Sterling Memorandum, supra note 111, at 6.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Final notes on Actavis: In March of 2015, Actavis acquired Allergan for $70.5 billion,
and adopted Allergan as its new global name. ALLERGAN, Actavis Completes Allergan
Acquisition, ALLERGAN.COM (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.allergan.com/news/news/thomson-reu
ters/actavis-completes-allergan-acquisition. Actavis, now Allergan, petitioned the U.S. Supreme
Court for Writ of Certiorari to weigh in on pharmaceutical product hopping. Ed Silverman,
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IV. EXAMINING THE ISSUE: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
Although the recent Second Circuit decision in Actavis provides some
guidance to brand-name pharmaceutical companies considering a product hop,
the issue is far from settled. With the Mylan case on appeal to the Third
Circuit, the case law around product hopping promises to continue growing.
Many gray areas remain ripe for litigation, but an examination of the
implications of these cases makes one thing clear: antitrust regulation of
product hopping is essential.
A.

Necessary Antitrust Regulation

Without question, the pharmaceutical market has a regulatory scheme and
structure that is unlike any other, making it a difficult and expensive place to
do business. But much to the chagrin of brand-name pharmaceutical companies
competing with generics in this market, society cannot afford to allow them
carte blanche in their marketing strategies. The ultimate goal of the Sherman
Act is to foster competition. 138 When a brand-name drug enters the market, it
faces weak, and in some cases, virtually non-existent competition from other
drugs. 139 Therefore, generics provide a source of competition by offering a
product that is extremely close to the brand-name drug but at only a fraction of
the price. 140 Without generic competition, brand-name pharmaceutical
companies would have the power to control market prices—the exact
definition of a monopoly. 141 As such, in order to keep competition alive in the
pharmaceutical market, antitrust regulation is not only warranted, but it is also
a necessity.
While fostering competition on its face is a sufficient enough reason to
warrant antitrust regulation, the underlying reason of access further bolsters the
argument. In the absence of competition, brand-name companies would control
the price of pharmaceutical drugs. In a country where people depend on drugs

Supreme Court Asked to Weigh Pharma Tactics Limiting Consumer Choice, STAT (Nov. 9, 2015)
http://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2015/11/09/supreme-court-asked-to-weigh-drug-patent-caseaffecting-consumer-choice/. However, on November 30, 2015, Allergan and New York Attorney
General Schniederman agreed to settle the case. NY AG and Allergan Settle Namenda ProductHopping Suit, PRAC. LAW (Dec. 4, 2015), http://us.practicallaw.com/w-001-0167. The settlement
required each party to pay its own costs, but Allergan reimbursed the New York Attorney General
$171,946 for a portion of the prosecution costs. Id. As a result of the settlement, the U.S.
Supreme Court dismissed Allergan’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Id.
138. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Federal Trade Commission Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant
at 22, Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Public Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824 (E.D. Pa.
2015) [hereinafter FTC Amicus Curiae].
139. Id. at 17.
140. See id. at 16–17.
141. Id. at 17.
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for everything from pain management to treating chronic illnesses, 142 this
reality could be truly disastrous. Without affordably priced prescriptions, the
seventy percent of U.S. citizens that take prescription drugs on a daily basis 143
could face extreme financial hardship. To illustrate, take the Actavis IR case.
Based on data provided to the court by Actavis, consumers would have to “pay
almost $300 million more, and third-party payers would pay almost $1.4
billion more,” if Actavis were permitted to remove IR prior to generic entry. 144
Additionally, the Department of Health and Human Services found that the
withdrawal of IR before generic entry would cost Medicare a minimum of six
billion dollars over ten years. 145 While these numbers are large, they only
represent one drug. If courts do not enforce antitrust violations against producthopping companies, product hopping could become more prevalent, and these
numbers could increase by a large multiplier. With drug-related spending
already accounting for twelve percent of total personal health care
expenditures, 146 it is questionable whether both the system and consumers
could sustain these potentially huge increases in price.
In response to these arguments, opponents assert that antitrust enforcement
impedes innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. 147 The idea of chilling
innovation and deterring the development of new, potentially life-saving drugs
is certainly concerning. However, this argument is less concerning than it
sounds. When submitting its Amicus Brief in support of Plaintiff-Appellee
State of New York in the Second Circuit Actavis case, the AAI addressed this
argument. First, the AAI asserted that no empirical evidence existed showing
that antitrust scrutiny of product hopping deters innovation. 148 Moreover, the
AAI further asserted that antitrust scrutiny of product hopping actually
increases innovation. 149 Without antitrust scrutiny of product hopping, brandname companies will invest in making minor alterations to products to extend
the patent, rather than investing in research for new, innovative drugs. 150
Indeed, one study found that “[b]rand-name firms have sought increasing

142. See generally Study Shows 70 Percent of Americans Take Prescription Drugs, CBS
NEWS (Jun. 20, 2013, 2:54 PM) http://www.cbsnews.com/news/study-shows-70-percent-of-amer
icans-take-prescription-drugs/.
143. Wenjun Zhong et al., Age and Sex Patterns of Drug Prescribing in a Defined American
Population, 88 Mayo Clinic Procs. 697, 699 (2013).
144. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 661 (2d Cir. 2015).
145. Id.
146. Zhong et al., supra note 143, at 697.
147. Brief for the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Appellants at 2, New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638 (2d
Cir. 2015) (No. 1:14-cv-07473).
148. American Antitrust Institute Brief, supra note 5.
149. Id. at 25–26.
150. Id.
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recourse to ancillary patents on chemical variants, alternative formulations,
methods of use, and relatively minor aspects of the drug.” 151 Essentially,
immunizing brand-name pharmaceutical companies from antitrust liability
encourages them to spend time and resources in order to find ways to make
insignificant changes to current drugs in order to preserve the patent, instead of
using time and resources to develop the next innovative drug.
In its Brief as Amicus Curiae filed with the district court in Mylan, the
FTC bolstered this argument by asserting: “The threat posed to existing brand
drugs by generic competition can incentivize the brand company facing
dramatic loss of sales to develop new and innovative drugs that benefit
consumers.” 152 Notably, the FTC recently filed a Brief for Amicus Curiae in
support of Mylan in its appeal to the Third Circuit. 153 In sum, there is no
evidence that antitrust regulation of product hopping slows down innovation
by brand-name pharmaceutical companies. Rather, regulation actually
encourages innovation, as the competition from generics causes brand-name
manufactures to innovate new products and prevents them from spending
resources on insignificant changes to extend patents.
B.

Limits on Antitrust Regulation

Without question, antitrust scrutiny is appropriate, and necessary, in order
to ensure that the pharmaceutical market continues to operate in a fair,
affordable manner. Courts that take a lenient view with brand-name
pharmaceutical companies leave consumers in the hands of monopoly powers
and at risk of exorbitant prices. Thus, a strict view of product hopping seems
warranted, and the Actavis Second Circuit decision supplies precedent to this
end. While antitrust scrutiny is beneficial, it must be recognized that it can also
be taken too far. Notwithstanding the fact that product hopping is an issue that
courts must take a firm stance on, there is a legitimate question of what remedy
is appropriate in these cases. Although the Second Circuit’s Actavis decision
supplies a framework for pharmaceutical companies seeking to avoid these
types of claims, the Second Circuit decision crosses a line that should remain
untouched.
After laying down the bright-line hard switching versus soft switching test
and examining the timing and intent of Actavis, the court affirmed a powerful
remedy. In its decision, the Second Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction
that barred Actavis from “restricting access to Namenda IR prior to generic
entry.” 154 This injunction effectively requires Actavis to continue

151. C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, 8
J. EMP. STUD. 613, 615 (2011), cited in American Antitrust Institute Brief, supra note 5, at 26.
152. Federal Trade Commission’s Brief as Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at 8.
153. See generally FTC Amicus Curiae, supra note 138.
154. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 2015).
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manufacturing a drug that it discontinued. 155 Although the facts clearly
demonstrated that Actavis intended to preclude generic entry, “forcing
production of a discontinued drug” is an “unprecedented” move. 156 The court
does not provide guidance on whether this type of injunction will be an
acceptable remedy for all product-hopping cases or if this remedy is a result of
the specific circumstances in this case. 157
In addition to requiring Actavis to continue producing a discontinued drug,
the injunction does not allow Actavis to change the terms in which the product
is sold. 158 That is, Actavis must “maintain the status quo” of marketing and
selling both IR and XR products to maintain consumer choice before and after
generic entry. 159 The court does not specify a minimum amount that Actavis
must spend on marketing IR. 160 But the court’s requirement that Actavis
maintain the status quo may imply that Actavis needs to spend an amount
consistent with their average marketing expenditures. Requiring that Actavis
maintain the status quo also raises the question of how courts issuing these
injunctions will ensure compliance with the injunction. Courts could
potentially require enjoined defendants to submit financial records showing
they are spending an appropriate amount on marketing both drugs equally.
However, producing financial and expense records could be costly for parties.
Additionally, reviewing these statements could be a very time consuming
process for courts.
Although the Second Circuit attempted to protect the market and
consumers, requiring a company to continue making a discontinued product
goes far beyond a traditional remedy. Actavis is the first product-hopping case
where the government brought the action and was also the first case seeking an
injunction. 161 Here, the injunction requiring Actavis to continue selling a
discontinued product reaches too far. While the goal of the Sherman Act is to
“foster price competition,” 162 the injunction takes this notion a step further by
essentially requiring that one company incur great expense to ensure another
company can compete with it. This notion runs afoul of the very intention of
antitrust law. Explaining the purpose and policy of the Sherman Act, the U.S.
Department of Justice asserts, “mere harm to competitors is not a basis for

155. Shearman & Sterling Memorandum, supra note 111.
156. Tobin Klusty, A Legal Test for the Pharmaceutical Company Practice of “Product
Hopping,” 17 AMA J. ETHICS 760, 762 (2015).
157. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, supra note 56.
158. Id.
159. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, No. 14-4624 (2d Cir.
2015).
160. Id.
161. See generally Actavis, 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015).
162. FTC Amicus Curiae, supra note 138, at 5.
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antitrust liability.” 163 Moreover, antitrust law is not meant to shield businesses
from the way the market works. 164 While antitrust law protects consumers by
punishing unfair business practices, it is not designed to force a company to aid
its competitors. Unfortunately, that is exactly what the injunction in Actavis
accomplishes.
Typically, courts have three options for remedy in antitrust cases:
injunctive relief, monetary damages, and in some instances, criminal
prosecution. 165 Courts have latitude to grant injunctive relief that may have far
reaching consequences in order to change a monopolist’s behavior. 166 The
Second Circuit has done so in the Actavis case, but the power of that injunction
seems to stretch beyond the intended scope of injunctive remedy. In cases such
as this, it seems more appropriate to seek monetary damages. 167 Since the end
goal of a product hopper is to preclude generic entry and thus profit from
monopoly power, it follows that monetary damages would be an appropriate
remedy. It could be argued that injunctive relief sends a stronger message;
however, assessing a hefty fine of punitive and compensatory damages would
likely get the attention of a brand-name pharmaceutical company just as well.
Forcing a company to continue manufacturing a product moves out of the
punitive realm and into a situation where a company is subsequently forced to
aid a competitor—which is beyond the scope of antitrust law. Conversely,
assessing monetary damages to blatant product hoppers achieves the goal of
punishing wrongdoing without overreaching into uncharted waters and setting
a potentially dangerous precedent.
C. Future Litigation and Supreme Court Intervention
Without question, pharmaceutical product hopping is far from resolution.
With so much at stake, it is unlikely that brand-name pharmaceutical
companies will cease efforts to avoid generic competition in the near future.
Moreover, Mylan, one of the most prominent product-hopping cases, may just
be getting started. Considering the extreme profits, coupled with the need for a
balance between innovation in the pharmaceutical industry and access to drugs,
it seems that Supreme Court intervention is looming.
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court almost had the opportunity to
decide whether or not to weigh in on product hopping, but it dismissed

163. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 11 (2008), www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/reports/2366
81.htm.
164. Id.
165. KENNETH P. EWING, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP, PLC CROSS-BORDER COMPETITION
HANDBOOK 87 (January 19, 2007), http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/2804.pdf.
166. Id. at 1.
167. Id.
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Allergan’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari because the parties settled the case. 168
Although the Supreme Court never heard arguments, Allergan’s Petition for
Certiorari outlines the potential questions that the Court will face should it
decide to take up a product-hopping case. The Petition presented the Court
with two salient issues: the first, “Whether exercising rights granted by the
Patent Act—in particular, not selling one patented product and selling a
different patented product instead—can violate the Sherman Antitrust Act?”169
The second issue was: “Whether drug manufacturers have a federal antitrust
duty to facilitate the operation of state drug substitution laws to maximize
competitor’s sales?” 170 Although it was dismissed, examining the Petition
provides insight into possible arguments the Supreme Court could hear in the
future.
Unsurprisingly, the Petition begins by describing the unprecedented
injunction that forced Allergan to continue producing and selling a drug they
considered retired. 171 The Second Circuit’s holding and injunction creates a
duty that a brand drug manufacturer must produce and sell an outdated product
to maximize the sales of generics. 172 In making a case to the Supreme Court,
Allergan expands on the common argument that antitrust regulation stifles
innovation by asserting that the innovation process occurs through small,
“incremental improvement[s]” and that brand-name companies must be
allowed to make these small improvements in order to progress. 173 While this
explanation of the innovation process may certainly provide a basis for
arguments by brand-name developers in future litigation, Allergan’s petition
also foreshadows future issues that may result from product-hopping litigation.
Allergan contends that the Second Circuit’s decision holding it liable for a
violation of antitrust law “[p]recipitates a [c]ircuit [s]plit.” 174 Allergan notes
that the Seventh Circuit, Fourth Circuit, and Eleventh Circuit have all
recognized that “[p]reventing competitors from free-riding on a monopolist’s
advertising or other investments is a legitimate business purpose that enhances
rather than impedes competition.” 175 Allergan contends that the Second Circuit
found antitrust liability where other circuits have not. 176 However, the
powerful implications of product hopping paired with the unique nature of the

168. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, No. 14-4624 (2d Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 581 (2015).
169. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015), petition
for cert. filed, 2015 WL 6774554, at *ii (U.S. Nov. 4, 2015) (No. 15-587) [hereinafter Allergan].
170. Id.
171. Id. at *2.
172. Id.
173. Id. at *29.
174. Allergan, 2015 WL 6774554, at *24.
175. Id.
176. Id. at *26.
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pharmaceutical market make it difficult to analogize a product-hopping case to
a typical antitrust case.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court did not issue a ruling there, the wait may
not be long for a second opportunity. The Mylan case presents a new
opportunity for the Court to weigh in on pharmaceutical product hopping. The
Mylan case seems to fall somewhere in between the hard switching done in
Actavis and the legal soft switching in Walgreen. If the Third Circuit affirms
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and does not follow the Actavis decision,
it will create a direct circuit split on the issue of antitrust liability for
pharmaceutical product hopping. The Third Circuit’s ruling on whether or not
there is antitrust liability in this case could begin to either solidify a stance
against product-hopping or further muddle the issue.
Interestingly, and perhaps as a result of the Actavis litigation, Mylan, the
generic drug, has gained the support of the FTC as it prepares its appeal. In the
Mylan District Court case, the FTC filed a brief as Amicus Curiae. 177
However, the FTC did not state in its brief whether or not it supported holding
product-hopping companies liable for violating antitrust law. 178 This amicus
brief merely discussed competition in the pharmaceutical industry and noted
the potential for brand-name manufacturers to exploit the market with product
hopping. 179 However, since Mylan appealed, the FTC made its stance clear by
filing a Brief for Amicus Curiae supporting Mylan and explaining that
companies who exploit monopoly power should face antitrust liability. 180 The
FTC contended that the district court erred in its judgment and misunderstood
the unique characteristics of the pharmaceutical market. 181 Additionally, the
FTC relied on the Second Circuit Actavis decision to support its contention that
Warner Chilcott had monopoly power and should face antitrust liability. 182 The
FTC maintained a neutral position when product-hopping litigation first began,
but it now seems to favor holding product-hopping companies liable for
antitrust violations. The shift in the FTC’s stance illustrates the magnitude of
these cases, which further complicates the decision facing the Third Circuit.
Adding to the need for Supreme Court intervention is the potential of a
circuit split on the issue of antitrust liability for pharmaceutical product
hopping. If a circuit split occurs, it could incentivize forum shopping, as
companies will likely try to litigate in a more favorable forum. Perhaps more
compelling is the increase in pharmaceutical startups, which magnifies the
issue of forum shopping. For instance, “investments in biotechnology start-ups
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rose 26 percent in the first half of 2014.” 183 Continuing this trend, “[t]he first
half of 2015 has already seen more than $6 [billion] invested, putting it on
track to beat 2014’s total of $11.2 [billion] invested.” 184 With this kind of
funding, it is likely that the number of startup pharmaceutical companies will
continue to rise.
Additionally, many brand-name pharmaceutical companies rely on smaller
startup pharmaceutical companies to innovate new products. 185 The drug
development process is expensive, but startup pharmaceutical companies have
streamlined operating costs and lower overhead, allowing these startups to
develop drugs more efficiently. 186 If startup pharmaceutical companies want to
preserve their patents, they may be incentivized to operate in a circuit with a
lenient stance on product hopping.
Depending on how the Third Circuit decides the Mylan appeal, a circuit
split and its accompanying forum-shopping incentives may be the catalyst that
prompts the Supreme Court to grant a writ and issue a decisive ruling on
antitrust liability for pharmaceutical product hopping. Even if the Third Circuit
follows Actavis, it remains to be seen whether it will follow the Second
Circuit’s remedy, use a different option, or create a new one. Perhaps this issue
of finding the appropriate remedy will attract the Court’s attention. Regardless,
Supreme Court intervention in the issue of product hopping seems likely, if not
imminent.
V. CONCLUSION
In the end, many questions remain surrounding the use of antitrust law to
prevent brand-name pharmaceutical companies from product hopping.
Certainly, enforcing antitrust laws against product-hopping companies is
essential to ensure that consumers can access the drugs they need. Permitting
brand-name manufacturers to skirt liability severely inhibits the ability of
generics to enter the market, thus upsetting the delicate balance of competition
in the unique pharmaceutical market. This scenario paints a grim picture for
the millions of Americans who depend on generic drugs to drive prices down
to accessible and affordable amounts.

183. Ryan Bushey, Five Biotech Startups to Watch in 2015, BIOSCIENCE TECH. (Jan. 13,
2015), http://www.biosciencetechnology.com/articles/2015/01/five-biotech-startups-watch-2015.
184. Healthcare Startup Boom: 2015 Could See More than $12B Invested into VC-Backed
Companies, CB INSIGHTS (Sep. 17, 2015), https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/healthcare-startupfunding-trends/.
185. Jacob Serebrin, Big Pharma Turns to Smaller Firms for Innovation, GLOBE & MAIL
(Jun. 24, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/small-business/
sb-money/big-pharma-turns-to-smaller-firms-for-innovation/article12751137/.
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However, zealous antitrust advocates must remain aware of the fact that
restricting brand-name pharmaceutical companies has a price, and pushing too
far threatens to stifle innovation of new drugs and treatments. Even more
perturbing is the potential for injunctive relief to impose potentially unfair and
overreaching remedies in these types of cases, as happened in Actavis.
Remembering that the goal of the Sherman Act is to foster competition, 187
courts hearing these cases must take care not to impose burdensome remedies
that reach too far and stifle the exact thing antitrust laws are trying to foster—
innovation and competition. Although Actavis’s soft versus hard switching
distinction gives brand-name pharmaceutical companies a bright-line rule to
follow, much is left unknown for companies trying to avoid liability in these
types of suits.
It seems that the high stakes surrounding the pharmaceutical market, the
potential circuit split, and the fear of unconscionable remedies may prompt the
Supreme Court to intervene. Issuing a definitive ruling explaining where the
line between permissible competitive strategies and impermissible
exclusionary conduct lies would provide much needed guidance to an industry
that survives by pushing the envelope of science and competition. Until such a
ruling happens, brand-name pharmaceutical companies and generics are left to
explore competitive advantages and battle over where the boundaries are
drawn. While this promises to provide some interesting litigation, the
uncertainty and potential consequences for the pharmaceutical industry that the
nation is so dependent upon is an unsettling notion for us all.
TYLER J. KLEIN *

187. Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984).
* Accepted for Publication by the Saint Louis University School of Law Journal of Health Law
and Policy, Fall 2016. © Tyler J. Klein. All Rights Reserved.

